China’s apparent reluctance to commit to the extra $200bn of US imports relative to 2017 levels that the US is requesting over the next two years as part of the Phase One deal is understandable: achieving the target would require imports from the US to expand by an implausible 40% in both years. Admittedly, the share of China’s imports coming from the US reached the lowest in two decades this year and there is scope for a rapid return to pre-trade war levels if retaliation against the US is reversed. But this would only go half-way towards meeting the $200bn goal, which would require the US share of China’s imports to jump well above previous highs. This seems unlikely, not least because the US may not have the capacity to ramp up production of the goods that China needs on such a large scale. (See here.)
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