Taking stock of central bank lending facilities - Capital Economics
Global Economics

Taking stock of central bank lending facilities

Global Central Bank Watch
Written by Simon MacAdam

Traditionally, when central banks respond to economic downturns, slashing policy interest rates makes for the headline act. This time, with rates already near zero at the onset of the crisis, rate cuts were only the warmup and, in some cases, didn’t even make the line-up. Instead, policy action by major central banks has in large part come in the form of a growing list of lending facilities.  Many of the schemes – such as the BoJ’s “Special Operations” – are brand new. Some – including the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility – are GFC-era schemes that have come out of retirement. Other, existing facilities – like the ECB’s TLTROs – have been beefed up.

  • Numerous lending facilities have been either launched, revived, or expanded
  • Many aim to provide liquidity to financial institutions and non-financial firms
  • But the line between liquidity operations and monetary policy is sometimes blurred

Traditionally, when central banks respond to economic downturns, slashing policy interest rates makes for the headline act. This time, with rates already near zero at the onset of the crisis, rate cuts were only the warmup and, in some cases, didn’t even make the line-up. Instead, policy action by major central banks has in large part come in the form of a growing list of lending facilities. (See Table 1 for details.) Many of the schemes – such as the BoJ’s “Special Operations” – are brand new. Some – including the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility – are GFC-era schemes that have come out of retirement. Other, existing facilities – like the ECB’s TLTROs – have been beefed up.

With so many lending facilities on the go, it is easy to lose sense of how much support has been offered by which central bank and for what purpose.

What are they designed to achieve?

In theory, we can distinguish between measures taken by central banks in their capacity as monetary policymakers and as lenders of last resort (LOLR). The former concerns policy interest rate reductions and open market operations, which aim to drive down market interest rates faced by borrowers in the real economy. LOLR operations, on the other hand, relate to the direct provision of liquidity – particularly to financial institutions – to avert a funding crisis.

In practice, though, the distinction is not always so clear cut. For instance, the objective of the ECB’s Longer-Term Refinancing Operations is to prevent a funding squeeze for banks. But the “Targeted” variant (TLTROs) are explicitly designed to stimulate bank lending to the real economy and keep borrowing costs low – traditionally an operational objective of looser monetary policy.

Recent asset purchases under central banks’ bond-buying schemes are also a grey area. In contrast with earlier rounds of QE, the stated purpose of the Fed’s latest foray into US Treasuries and MBS was to restore liquidity to these markets. (See here.) But the purchases have nonetheless contributed to lower market yields, and not just on these securities.

As for the BoE’s latest round of QE, we suspect that the principal motivation was to inject liquidity into the gilt market. But sooner or later, the emphasis of the Asset Purchase Facility is likely to switch back to one of monetary policy. Indeed, even before two MPC members voted for an extra £100bn of QE at their policy meeting this morning, we argued that the BoE will eventually be forced to conduct more asset purchases in an attempt to boost inflation. (See here.) Like the BoE, the ECB has claimed that its latest round of asset purchases (PEPP) has the dual objective of stabilising market conditions as well as providing additional monetary accommodation.

Chart 1 gives some idea of where a number of the schemes lie in terms of their objectives. In general, the primary purpose of most of the lending facilities in operation is the provision of market liquidity.

Chart 1: Spectrum of Central Bank Policy Action

Source: Capital Economics

How should their effectiveness be judged?

With monetary policy loosening, the short-term yardstick for success is the extent to which market interest rates fall, credit spreads tighten, and bank credit conditions for private sector loans ease.

But if central bank action is about easing funding constraints in particular markets, then we must look at the market in question for decreased levels of stress. In the commercial paper market, for example, reversing or preventing a blow out of spreads is a strong sign that things are going to plan. On this basis, central banks’ efforts generally look to be paying off. (See Chart 2.) Spreads on UK commercial paper remain elevated despite the BoE buying almost £17bn worth of prime paper through its new Covid Corporate Financing Facility since the middle of March. But, broadly speaking, liquidity provision measures are doing the job of normalising conditions throughout money markets. (See our latest Financial Market Stress Monitor.)

Chart 2: 3M Commercial Paper-Gov. Bill Spreads (bp)

Sources: Refinitiv, Bloomberg, Capital Economics

When the aim of the lending scheme is to unlock lending to households and firms – rather than to ensure money market functioning – the early signs of success are seen in the take-up for the loans on offer. And to the extent that these targeted loan schemes are a cheap source of bank finance and end up satisfying funding needs in the real economy, they should help to relieve strains in capital markets too.

New rounds of targeted finance operations have been introduced only recently, and the Fed’s Main Street Business Lending Program still hasn’t even got off the ground. So, it’s still too early to judge the take-up of cheap loans. But there is cause for optimism. If the BoE’s TFSME turns out to be as successful as its Term Funding Scheme predecessor, Bank estimates suggest that it could unleash £200bn (9% of GDP) of private sector funds. As for the ECB’s TLTROs, we’ve been sceptical of their efficacy in boosting euro-zone lending in the past. (See here.) But loan terms have now become a lot more generous for banks, meaning that the latest round of TLTROs may well do the trick to support lending to the non-financial private sector.

Meanwhile, the Fed’s Main Street Program doesn’t take any chances with depending on financial intermediaries to do its bidding in increasing lending to cash-strapped firms. The US central bank’s 85-95% participations in four-year loans to companies (with fewer than 10,000 employees or revenues below $5bn) will be the closest any major central bank has got to extending bank loans directly to main street. This direct approach is likely to be more effective than that of other central banks, which relies on (merely) incentivising banks to lend.

What to make of the all these lending facilities?

Stepping back from the quagmire of schemes, facilities and operations, three points stand out.

First, although there are shades of grey, most of what central banks have been up to concerns the provision of liquidity to ward off a funding crisis. Initially, the support was intended to prevent financial markets seizing up. It is increasingly about throwing lifelines to non-financial companies.

Second, because policymakers are principally engaged in liquidity operations, it would be misleading to draw simple comparisons between the scale of the measures being announced. Large outflows from the US’s systemically important $4tn money market funds in March has necessitated a bold response in a way that the five-basis-point increase in Japanese interbank spreads has not. The appropriate response depends on the circumstances. Similarly, with low corporate bond spreads in Japan, and surveys indicating that firms face very favourable bank lending conditions, the BoJ has less cause to follow the Fed in providing direct loans to business.

Third, emergency liquidity provision has so far been reasonably successful at containing financial market stress. Time will tell whether targeted finance operations will bear their fruit. If central banks have got money market strains covered, then these generous lending schemes stand a decent chance of keeping the credit taps turned on. Further ahead, though, central banks may struggle to do more to boost demand and meet their inflation targets.

Table 1: Central Bank Lending Facilities Launched, Revived or Expanded in Response to COVID-19 Crisis

Date

Programme

Details

Federal Reserve

17th March

Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)

Relaunched GFC facility. Direct <90-day loans to primary dealers of government securities. Scheduled end date: 17th September 2020.

17th March

Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)

Relaunched GFC facility. SPV purchases of unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper at issuance. List of eligible securities expanded to include tax-exempt paper on 23rd March. Scheduled end date: 17th March 2021.

18th March

Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF)

Direct loans to financial institutions to buy money market mutual fund assets including Treasuries, GSE securities, high-grade commercial paper and CDs, and short-term municipal debt. List of eligible municipal securities and CDs expanded on 23rd March. Scheduled end date: 30th September 2020.

23rd March

Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF)

SPV loans to, and new-issue bond purchases of, investment-grade or recently fallen-angel companies (<4yr maturity). Debtors can defer repayments for up to six months (“extendable at the Federal Reserve’s discretion”). Eligible securities expanded to include bonds issued by recently fallen-angel corporates (lower rating limit of BB-) as well as up to 25% of new loan syndications on 9th April. PMCCF and SMCCF loans and purchases sum to $750bn. Scheduled end date: 30th September 2020.

23rd March

Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF)

SPV purchases of outstanding bonds (<5yr remaining maturity) of investment-grade and recently fallen-angel corporate issuers, in addition to US corporate bond ETFs. Eligible securities expanded to include bonds issued by recently fallen-angel corporates (lower rating limit of BB-) as well as high-yield bond ETFs on 9th April. PMCCF and SMCCF loans and purchases sum to $750bn. Scheduled end date: 30th September 2020.

23rd March

Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)

Relaunched GFC facility. $100bn worth of three-year, non-recourse SPV loans to companies that own recently issued AAA-rated ABS backed by newly originated private sector loans. Eligible securities expanded to include ABS backed by leveraged loans and commercial mortgages on 9th April. Scheduled end date: 30th September 2020.

9th April

Main Street Business Lending Program, operating through: Main Street New/Priority/Expanded Loan Facilities

85-95% SPV participations worth $600bn in four-year loans (at LIBOR + 3%) to companies with <10,000 employees or revenues <$5bn. Principal and interest payments deferred for one year. Programme expanded to cover smaller and more indebted companies, with lower minimum and higher maximum loan sizes, and a third loan category, on 30th April. Scheduled end date: 30th September 2020.

9th April

Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF)

$659bn worth of direct, non-recourse loans to eligible financial intermediaries that lend money to small businesses through the federal government’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). Scheduled end date: 30th September 2020.

9th April

Municipal Liquidity Facility

$50bn worth of primary market SPV purchases of municipal notes (<3yr maturity) from all states, DC, and eligible local governments. Local government eligibility expanded, and maximum term length extended on 27th April. Scheduled end date: 31st December 2020.

European Central Bank

12th March

Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)

New three-month liquidity operations for banks to be conducted between 17th March and 9th June. Interest rate cut to deposit rate. Expanded list of eligible collateral for banks’ LTRO participation on 7th April, in place until the end of September 2021. List of eligible collateral expanded further, for LTRO and other Eurosystem credit operations, to include recently fallen-angel securities (lower rating limit of BB) on 22nd April.

12th March

Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs)

Borrowing terms made more generous. Raised limits on TLTRO borrowing from 30% of a borrower’s outstanding eligible loan book to 50% and reduced borrowing costs to benchmark policy rates minus 25bp. Borrowing costs reduced further to policy rates minus 50bp on 30th April.

12th March

Asset Purchase Programme (APP)

Additional net asset purchases of €120bn by end-2020, with “a strong contribution” from corporate bond purchases.

18th March

Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)

New €750bn asset purchase programme – including corporate bond purchases – to be conducted by end-2020.

18th March

Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP)

Expanded the list of eligible assets for ECB purchases to include non-financial commercial paper.

30th April

Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTROs)

New 8-16-month LTROs for banks at the ECB deposit rate minus 25bp (compared to just the deposit rate, as with standard LTROs) to be conducted between 20th May and 2nd December 2020.

Bank of Japan

16th March

Special Funds-Supplying Operations to Facilitate Financing in Response to the Novel Coronavirus (“Special Operations”)

¥23tn worth of <1yr interest-free loans to financial institutions, collateralised by private debt, until 30th September. Twice the amount of lending undertaken by banks will be added to reserve balances carrying an interest rate of +0.1% rather than the -0.1% policy rate. Facility renamed and scaled up from ¥8tn, list of eligible collateral lengthened, and interest rate on reserve balances corresponding to the scheme raised from 0% on 27th April.

Outright Purchases of Commercial Paper and Corporate Bonds (“Outright Purchases”)

Increase upper limit of purchases of commercial paper and corporate bonds (<5yr remaining maturity) by ¥15tn until 30th September. Annual pace of purchases of equity-linked ETFs and J-REITs doubled to ¥12tn and ¥180bn, respectively. Planned additional purchases of commercial paper and corporate bond scaled up from ¥2tn on 27th April.

27th April

New Fund-Provisioning Measure

Bank to set up new lending facility that extends interest-free, collateralised loans to banks to provide credit-guaranteed, low-interest loans as included in the government’s latest fiscal support package. Twice the amount of lending undertaken under the scheme will be added to reserve balances carrying an interest rate of +0.1% rather than the -0.1% policy rate.

Bank of England

11th March

Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs (TFSME)

Four-year loans to banks of at least 5% of a borrower’s outstanding eligible loan book at interest rates at, or very close to, the BoE’s policy rate. Additional funding available for banks that increase lending to SMEs. Scheme in operation for at least a year. Amount banks can borrow raised from 5% of outstanding loans to 10% on 19th March.

17th March

Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF)

Unlimited purchases of <1yr sterling non-financial investment-grade commercial paper at issuance.

19th March

Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS)

Holdings of sterling non-financial investment-grade corporate bonds to increase by at least £10bn as soon as is “operationally possible”.

24th March

Contingent Term Repo Facility (CTRF)

Relaunched facility. Unlimited 1-3-month loans to financial institutions in exchange for eligible collateral. Initially in operation for two weeks but extended to 30th April on 30th March.

Sources: Central Banks, Capital Economics

Recent Monetary Policy Developments

Review of recent policy rate changes

March saw a widespread slashing of interest rates throughout most of the world. But while seven of the 20 central banks we cover in this publication have cut their policy rate since then (see Chart 3), six of those were in emerging economies: Russia, Poland, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. (See Table 3.) The Norges Bank has been the only DM central bank to cut rates since March – a decision that took the consensus, but not us, by surprise. (See here.)

Chart 3: Changes in Benchmark Rates

Sources: Bloomberg, Capital Economics

This contrast between conventional policy action in advanced and emerging economies reflects the fact that the latter had a lot more room to manoeuvre coming into the current crisis. Even after last year’s easing cycle, the average policy rate in major EMs was 5%, compared to 0.5% in DMs. (See Chart 4.)

Chart 4: Simple Average Policy Interest Rates (%)

Sources: Bloomberg, Capital Economics

More DM cuts on the way, but small beer

DM central banks aren’t quite finished with rate cuts. We expect the ECB to reduce its key policy rate by a further 20bps from -0.50% to -0.70% in Q3. Some of the Nordics are likely follow in the ECB’s footsteps and trim a bit off interest rates too. Meanwhile, we expect the RBNZ to cut rates into negative territory before the year is out. (See Table 2.)

Policymakers elsewhere in advanced economies will have little choice but to keep interest rates where they are. In contrast, we expect further rate cuts in most EMs. In some cases, like in Russia and Mexico, we think that fiscal constraints will leave monetary policymakers having to do the heavy lifting by slashing interest rates by at least 100bps.

Table 2: Summary of CE Forecasts for Policy Rate
Net Changes by the End of 2020

Policy

Direction

Economies

Easing

China, Mexico, S. Korea, Euro-zone, Brazil, Switzerland, Denmark, Russia, Sweden, India, S. Africa, N. Zealand

No Change

Australia, UK, US, Canada, Poland, Japan, Norway, Turkey

Tightening

Source: Capital Economics

Currency concerns will preclude cuts in some EMs

However, central banks in Turkey and a couple of other EMs are likely to drop out of the ongoing easing cycle over exchange rate concerns. With its policy rate at 8.75%, it would seem that Turkey has tremendous scope to provide further monetary support. However, investors are highly unlikely to tolerate another sharp rate cut. And with the central bank’s firepower to defend the lira heavily depleted, interest rates will most likely be left on hold during the rest of 2020. It’s a similar story in Indonesia.

QE or not QE? That is the question

We have already discussed how recent large-scale asset purchases in major DMs fall into a grey area between conventional monetary policy (in the post-GFC sense) and emergency liquidity provision.

But, in light of numerous EM central banks joining the bond-buying club, this is no longer a debate taking place purely in advanced economies. Indeed, South Africa, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Colombia, Chile and the Philippines have now all embarked on asset purchase programmes, with policymakers in Brazil and the Czech Republic eager to join them. In our view, the schemes are primarily liquidity operations designed to stabilise financial conditions rather than a QE-style policy loosening. (See here.)

Table 3: Central Bank Policy Rates

Country

Policy rate

Latest

Last Change

Next Change

(CE Forecast)

End-2020

End-2021

Major Advanced Economies

US

Fed funds target

0.00-0.25

Down 150bp (Mar. 2020)

None on horizon

0.00-0.25

0.00-0.25

Euro-zone

Deposit rate

-0.50

Down 10bp (Sep. 2019)

Down 20bp (Q3 2020)

-0.70

-0.70

Japan

Interest on excess reserves

-0.10

Down 10bp (Jan. 2016)

None on horizon

-0.10

-0.10

UK

Bank Rate

0.10

Down 65bp (Mar. 2020)

None on horizon

0.10

0.10

Other Advanced Economies

Canada

Overnight target rate

0.25

Down 150bp (Mar. 2020)

None on horizon

0.25

0.25

Australia

Cash rate

0.25

Down 50bp (Mar. 2020)

None on horizon

0.25

0.25

Switzerland

Sight deposit rate

-0.75

Down 50bp (Jan. 2015)

Down 25bp (Q3 2020)

-1.00

-1.00

Sweden

Repo rate

0.00

Up 25bp (Dec. 2019)

Down 25bp (Q3 2020)

-0.25

-0.25

Denmark

Deposit rate

-0.60

Up 15bp (Mar. 2019)

Down 20bp (Q3 2020)

-0.80

-0.80

Norway

Sight deposit rate

0.00

Down 25bp (Apr. 2020)

None on horizon

0.00

0.00

New Zealand

Cash rate

0.25

Down 75bp (Mar. 2020)

Down by 50bp (Q3 2020)

-0.75

-0.75

Major Emerging Economies

China

7-day reverse repo rate

2.20

Down 20bp (Mar. 2020)

Down 60bp (Q2 2020)

1.00

1.00

India

Repo rate

4.40

Down 75bp (Mar. 2020)

Down 40bp (Q2 2020)

4.00

4.50

Brazil

Selic rate

3.00

Down 75bp (May. 2020)

Down 50bp (Jun 2020)

2.50

3.00

Russia

1-week repo rate

5.50

Down 50bp (Apr. 2020)

Down 50bp (Jun 2020)

4.50

4.50

Mexico

Overnight target rate

6.00

Down 50bp (Apr. 2020)

Down 100bp (May 2020)

4.50

4.50

South Korea

Base rate

0.75

Down 50bp (Mar. 2020)

Down 25bp (Q2 2020)

0.50

0.50

Turkey

1-week repo rate

8.75

Down 100bp (Apr. 2020)

Up 50bp (H2 2021)

8.75

10.25

Poland

Reference rate

0.50

Down 50bp (Apr. 2020)

Up 25bp (2022)

0.50

0.50

South Africa

Repo rate

4.25

Down 100bp (Apr. 2020)

Down 50bp (May 2020)

3.50

3.50

Sources: Bloomberg, Capital Economics.

Table 4: Quantitative Easing & Other Unconventional Policies

Central bank

Planned Asset Purchases & Lending Facilities

CE Forecast of Future Changes

Federal Reserve Bank

US Treasury and MBS purchases are being undertaken to mitigate liquidity shortages in these markets. The Fed has also unveiled nine new/revived lending facilities in recent weeks. In addition to satisfying money market liquidity needs, the Fed will use $195bn of Treasury capital to extend loans or make debt security purchases worth up to $2.3trn, equivalent to 10% of GDP.

In total, we expect the Fed to purchase a further $120bn of US Treasuries and MBS in May, but asset purchases will slow further after that, perhaps to around $60bn per month thereafter. The Fed’s balance sheet is likely to expand gradually to around $10tn, albeit with more of a focus on establishing and expanding its credit facilities for the private sector rather than purchasing Treasuries.

European Central Bank

On top of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) to purchase €750bn of assets by the end of 2020, the ECB has launched a new series of Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTROs). These will be offered in seven operations beginning this month, at 25bp below the benchmark rates. The ECB also reduced the minimum cost of its longer-term refinancing operations to 50bps below the deposit rate.

After the ECB raised the limit for TLTRO borrowing from 30% of eligible loans to 50%, we expect much higher uptake from banks in the weeks and months ahead. We expect the ECB to increase its asset purchases under the PEPP programme by €500bn from July.

Bank of Japan

The Bank finally ditched its redundant commitment to expand its holdings of JGBs by ¥80tn a year, noting instead that it will purchase “a necessary amount of JGBs so that yields will remain around 0%”. The Bank will also buy an additional ¥7.5tn of commercial paper and an additional ¥7.5tn of corporate bonds this year. What’s more, the Bank will allow commercial banks to use private sector debt as collateral in the new emergency lending facility that it set up in March.

While the BoJ’s purchase schedule currently points to annualised JGB purchases of around ¥75tn this year – implying an increase in JGB holdings by around ¥20tn– we’re sticking to our forecast that JGB holdings will increase by a smaller ¥15tn as the Bank scales back purchases.

Bank of England

In the first six weeks since the expansion of QE was announced on 19th March, the Bank has bought £70bn of assets. That run rate of £50bn a month is twice the pace of purchases during the financial crisis. Moreover, the Bank has lent £11.2bn to businesses in the first four weeks of the Covid Corporate Financing Facility and £6bn to banks in the first week of the new Term Funding Scheme (TFSME).

We expect the MPC to expand QE by around £100bn at the meeting in June. Further ahead, we wouldn’t be surprised if the MPC ends up doing much more – including potentially yield curve control – over the coming months and years.

Bank of Canada

The Bank of Canada has announced several credit easing measures aimed at specific markets, including programmes to purchase mortgage bonds, bankers’ acceptances and provincial bills. The increase in the Bank’s assets by $200bn since mid-March, mainly reflects the Bank’s repo operations, which have totalled $127bn. Future increases will be mainly due to purchases under its new Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) program, Corporate Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) and Provincial Bond Purchase Program (PBPP).

We expect the Bank’s assets to rise by at least another $200bn by the end of the year. The Bank has purchased $17bn of government debt securities under LSAP so far, but if the programme remains in place throughout this year, then they are likely to reach $150bn. The Bank has committed to buy $50bn of provincial bonds and a rather paltry $10bn of corporate bonds, but we suspect it will end up increasing the amount of corporate bonds that it buys.

Swiss National Bank

The SNB announced that it will reduce the bank’s countercyclical capital buffer to zero. The Bank also stepped up support for banks by making unlimited amounts of liquidity available to banks at the policy rate. Occasional FX intervention.

Policymakers will continue to intervene in the FX market to resist upward pressure on the currency.

Riksbank

The 30% rise in the Riksbank’s balance sheet is second only to the Fed’s, and more than twice that of the ECB. About three-quarters of the jump relates to lending to banks, mostly in the form of the TLTRO-style ‘loans for onward lending’ scheme, while the rest stems from asset purchases as part of its new policy of buying up to SEK 300 billion of extra bonds this year.

The Bank has announced that it will purchase SEK 85bn of covered bonds by the end of Q3. But given that about one third of the SEK 300bn purchase programme is still unaccounted for, we suspect it will end up buying more much more than this.

Sources: Central banks, Capital Economics.

Table 5: Calendar of Policy Decisions

Date

Economy

Policy Instrument

Prior

Survey

CE Forecast

13th May

New Zealand

Cash Rate

0.25

0.25

14th May

Mexico

Overnight Target Rate

6.00

5.50

20th May

China

7-day PBOC reverse repo

2.20

1.60

21st May

Turkey

1-week repo rate

8.75

8.75

South Africa

Repo Rate

5.25

4.75

28th May

South Korea

Base Rate

0.75

0.50

2nd June

Australia

Cash Rate

0.25

0.25

3rd June

Canada

Overnight Target Rate

0.25

0.25

4th June

Euro-zone

Deposit Rate

-0.50

-0.50

5th June

India

Repo Rate

4.40

4.00

10th June

United States

Fed Funds Target Range

0.00-0.25

0.00-0.25

16th June

Japan

Interest on excess reserves

-0.10

-0.10

Brazil

Selic Rate

3.00

2.50

Chile

Overnight Rate

0.50

0.50

18th June

Switzerland

Sight deposit rate

-0.75

-0.75

Norway

Sight Deposit Rate

0.00

0.00

United Kingdom

Bank Rate

0.10

0.10

19th June

Russia

1-week repo rate

5.50

5.00

24th June

New Zealand

Cash Rate

0.25

25th June

Turkey

1-week repo rate

8.75

Mexico

Overnight Target Rate

30th June

Sweden

Repo Rate

0.00

0.00

7th July

Australia

Cash Rate

0.25

15th July

Canada

Overnight Target Rate

0.25

16th July

South Korea

Base Rate

0.50

Euro-zone

Deposit Rate

-0.50

23rd July

Turkey

1-week repo rate

8.75

South Africa

Repo Rate

24th July

Russia

1-week repo rate

29th July

United States

Fed Funds Target Range

0.00-0.25

4th August

Brazil

Selic Rate

6th August

India

Repo Rate

4.00

United Kingdom

Bank Rate

0.10

Sources: Bloomberg, Capital Economics


Simon MacAdam, Global Economist, simon.macadam@capitaleconomics.com
Gabriella Dickens, Assistant Economist, gabriella.dickens@capitaleconomics.com