Russia’s government appears to be heading towards a default on its foreign currency debts for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution. This won’t affect the Russian government’s ability to finance itself (beyond what sanctions have already done) and it seems unlikely that there will be significant spillovers elsewhere. Perhaps the bigger risk is that it may be a prelude to defaults by Russian corporates, whose external debts are more than four times larger than those of the sovereign.
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